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fortyping.The purpose of this paper is to analyze the market for optometric
servicesin the United States. This is done primarily by specifying and
estimatinga market model for optometric services. Within the context
of the model marty of the more interesting questions relating to the prac-
tice of optometry can be considered. Some of these are: What factors
influence the location decision of the optometrist? What effectdoes
advertisinghave on thedemand for optometric services? Towhat extent
is the interstate mobility of optometrists inhibited by restrictive
licensingarrangements? To what degree arethe services of ophthalmolo-
gistsandopticianssubstituted for those of the optometrist? Whatrole
do price and income play in determining the demand for optometric ser-
vices?
This paper is divided into seven sections. In the following section
anoverview of the practice of optometry is presented. Thisissucceeded
by an examination of the distribution of eye health professionals in the
United States. In sections 3—5 a market model for optometric services
is specified and discussed. Next, estimates of the model are presented.
Finally, the implications of this research are considered.
1. The Practice of Optometry: An Overview
The primary health services provided by optometrists are the examin-
ation of the eye andthe prescription and provision of lenses to correct
refractiveerror. Optometristsalso adjust andrepair eyeglasses. The
meangross income of the16,000 self-employed optometrists in the United
Statesfrom their professional practicesisapproximately $50 thousand,—2—
implyingthat upwards of$800 million are spentannually onthe services
of self—employed optometrists.1 Optometrists are engaged primarily in
solo practice. About 17 percent of self—employed optometrists are in
partnerships or group practices.2 Most optometrists are general practi-
tioners. Only about 3.5 percent of optometrists specialize in contact
lenses, vision training, industrial vision or other fields.3
Besides optometrists, two other eye professions are involved in the
deliveryof eye care services in the United States. The ophthalmologist
diagnoses eye disease, administers medical treatment, performs surgical
operations, and prescribes eyeglasses to correct refractive error. The
primaryrole of the opticianis the fitting and dispensing of eyeglasses
accordingto prescription. There are approximately 8,600 active ophthal—
mologists and about 11,000 active opticians in the United States.4
2. The Distribution of Eye Health Professionals
inthe United States
The uneven distribution of primary health professionals in the United
Stateshas longbeen a source of concernto health economists. In 1971,
for example, the mean numberofphysicians per 100,000 population in rural
5
states was 93.5, as compared to 125.8 inurban states.Optometrists,
likephysicians, are moreheavilyconcentrated in urbanareas.There are
9.7 active optometristsper 100,000 inurban states as compared to7.8in
rural states.Asimilar disparity exists in ophthalmology manpower between
urbanandrural states. There are 4.8 active ophthalmologistsper100,000
populationin urban states and 3.6 per 100,000 in rural states. Opticians—3—
are also concentrated in urbanstates,with 7.0 active practitioners per
100,000 population, as compared to 4.2 per 100,000 in ruralstates.6
Because ruralpractitionersare also fewerspacially,their rela-
tive scarcity is magnified.Inaddition, rural practitioners areprob-
ably older than their urban counterparts,andthus could be less
productive.7 It should be noted, however, thatdespitethe differentials
thatexistin medical manpower between urbanand rural states,there is
no evidence that the residents of those states where the supply of medical
Services is low are in poorer health as a result.8
Because of the concern over the "maldistribution" of health profes-
sionals, an important emphasis of this research is an examination of the
location decision of the optometrist. The market model discussed in the
following section is specified so that the location decision of the
optometrist comprises one of the structural equations.
3. pecification of the Model
Afullyspecified model of the market for optometric services must
describe both the demand for and supply of optometric services. The
model estimated in this paper consists of a demand equation, twoequa-
tions whichtogether describe the supply of optometric services and one
identity.9 The supply side is investigated byexamining theworkload
andlocation decisions of theoptometrist. Pour variablesinthe model
areendogenous. These are the per capita quantity of optometric services
danded, price, thepercapita number of optometrists and theworkload
of the optometrist. The model is presented beloW.—4—
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Age —percentof the population 65 and over
NW —percentof the population non—white
Ed —percentofthe population with 1-3 years
of college
Oph — ophthalmologistsper 100,000 population
Opti —opticiansper 100,000 population
Opto —optometristsper 100,000population
Advert—advertisingrestriction dummy,
1 —nostaterestrictions on advertising
License —nationalboardlicensinq.duny
1—nationalboards not accepted
Grads —numberof graduating optometrists from
optometryschools
Work —averageannual output supplied by
optometrists—5—
4. The Data
The model is estimated across states by combining several data sources
from the mid—1960's. Two of these sourtes are used to compute the quantity
measure of the per capita consumption of optometric services by state.
This measure is calculated by multiplying the annual averaqe output of
optometrists in each state by the number of practicing optometrists per
100,000 population. The latter figure is taken from the 1968 National
Vision and Eye Care Manpower Survey of the National Center for Health Sta-
tistics.1° Theaverage output figure is derived from data collected in the
1964 American Optometric Association Survey of Optometrists. In this na-
tional survey data were collected from over 4,000 optometrists on the whole-
sale value of lenses, temples, and frames purchased by the optometrist in
1964 and on the annual number of visual examinations provided. These out-
put measures can be converted into a single output index by deflating the
wholesale value of eyeglasses to physical units and then combining the
number of eyeglasses and eye examinations provided into a single measure
by using the respective prices as weights.11
The 1964 average output of optometrists by state is determined by
averaging the output indexes of those optometrists who responded to the
AOA survey. Those states where less than forty optometrists responded to
the AOAsurveywere excluded from the data base.Thirty-twostates had
forty or nre respondents. These average output figures are then multi-
plied by the number of practicing optometrists per 100,000 population in
1968 in order to compute the quantity measure of the consumptin of
optometricservices per100,000 population for each of the 32 states.—6—
Any bias in this measure resulting fromthecombining of the data sources
frantwo different years should notbelarge since any changes in the
state percapita stocks of optometrists over the four—year period would
be small.
The data sources for the remaining variables included in the model
are revealed as each equation is discussed in detail.
5. DisCussion of Ea'uation Specifications
5.] The Demand for Optometric Services
Awell-specifieddemand equation includesprice of the product,the
incomeofpotential consumers, the prices of substitutes andcomplements
andtaste variables. Equation 1falls somewhat short of this ideal. The
price variable is derived from the 1964 ADA survey of optometrists. It
iscomputed for each statebytakingaweighted average of the gross
annual income per unit of output of the responding optometrists, where
the weight is the units of output produced.
The prices of the competing eye care services offered by ophthal-
mologistsand opticians cannot be included in the demand equationbecause
thedata are not available. However, it may be possible to gain some
idea of the substitutability of the services of competing eye profes-
sionals for those of the optometrist by entering the number of ophthal—
aologists and opticians per 100,000 population into the demand equation.
A problem withthis approach isthat the relationship between the number
ofpractitioners and the price oftheir services is not clear. On the one
hand,an aboveaveragenumber of practitioners might depress price to a—7—
belowaverage level; on the other hand, higher thanaverageprices could
serveto attract a higher than average ninnber of practitioners.
Adummy variableis included in the demand equation which takes on
a value of one for those states that did not restrict the advertising of
optometric services. The advertising of optometric services should re-
duce the cost of these services to consumers. Search costs are reduced
because the price and terms of sale as well as information on the sup-
pliers identity, location and reliability are, often provided. Lee
Benham has shown that advertising also lowers the price paid by con-
sumers foreyeglasses because it stimulates price competition among
12 sellers.Holding price constant, the effect of advertising should be
to shift the demand curve for optometric services to the right because
it lowers the information Costs faced by consumers and may also enable
optometrists to more effectively compete with ophthalmologists for
patients seeking visual examinations and corrective lenses. Ophthal—
mologists,like all physicians, cannot advertise as a condition of
license.
Those states not restricting advertising were determined from Lee
Benham'sclassification of states in accordance with the restrictions
placedon the advertising of eyeglasses. Benham constructed the series
byexamining statelaws, by interviewing optometrists and members of
state optometryboards, andby searching newspapers for eyeglass adver-
t.tsements.
Several socioeconomic variables have been specified in the demand
equation.The age distribution variable, percent of the population 65—8—
andover, was included in the demand relation because the need for and
utilization of corrective lenses increases dramatically with age. Near
vision generally deteriorates auite rapidly after the age of 35, with
90 percent of adults between the ages of 45 and 54 having visual acuity
13 of lessthan 14/14. The same pattern holds for distance vision, al-
though the rate of deterioration with age is not as great. With this
background, it is not surprising to find that the utilization of
correctivelenses increases markedly with age. About90 percent of
adultshaveeyeglasses by the age of 60) Consequently, the older the
population the optometrist serves, the greater should be the demand for
his services.
The race variable, percent non-white, is included as an independent
variable because of evidence that blacks have stronger vision than whites.
Forexample,atthe age of50, about 90 percent of Negro maleshaveun-
corrected distance vision of 20/30 or better as compared to less than 75
percent of the white male population of the same age)5 To test whether
inter—state differences in racial composition actually translate into
differences in the demand for optometric services, the percent of the
population that is non—white is entered into thedemandequation.
Income and education may also play a role in determining the demand
for optometric services. The utilization of corrective lenses is posi—
tively correlatedwith family income andthe education of the family head.
Fiftypercentof the population in families with income in excess of
$5,000had corrective lenses in 1965—66, as comparedto 44 percent of the
meabersof families with incomeless than $5,000.Fifty-four percent of—9—
the population in families where the head had 13 or more years of educa-
tion owned corrective lenses in 1965—66, while 46 percent of the members
of families where the head had less than 13 years of schooling had correc-
tive lenses'6 it is not evident from these figures whether the income
effect results from the higher educational levels associated with higher
incomeindividuals, or whether the educational effect actually reflects
a positive income elasticity for corrective lenses. In order to separate
outtheeffects of income and education on the demand for optometric
services, the state per capita income andthepercent of the state popu-
lation with 1—3 years of college are entered into the demand equation.
Although the utilization of corrective lenses increases with income
and education it is not clear, ajriori, that the partial effects of in-
come andeducationon the demand for optometric services would be posi-
tive. This is because the higher the income andeducationof an .individ-
ual, the more likely he is to use the services of an ophthalmologist
instead of an optometrist to obtain an optical prescription. Twenty-
five percent of those individuals with family income under $5,000 who
hadaneye examination and purchased eyeglasses duringthe two years
precedingJuly1965 to June1966used an. ophthalmologist as a source of
theiroptical prescription, while the same figure for those with family
income of$5,000 and over was 36 percent. Similarly, 28 percent of
thoseindividualswhose family head had twelve years of schooling or
less used an ophthalmologist as the source of their optical prescription
while the comparable figure was 48 percent for those individuals whose
family head hadthirteenyearsofschooling andover)7— 10—
Allof the socioeconomic variables were collected from the 1970
census.
5.2 The Supply of Optometric Services.
The determinants of the supply of optometric services are examined
by the estimation of a location equation and an average rkload equa-
tion.
5.2a The Location of Optometrists
Price is included in the location equation and is expected to be
positively associated with the number of optometrists per 100,000popu—
lation.With price held constant, the percapitaincome variable in
the location equation must be interpreted as a proxyforthe cultural,
educational and other environmental advantages of a state which are
correlatedwith per capita income.
The number of graduating students in optometry schools is entered
into the equation to test whether graduating optometrists have a propen-
sity to remain in the state where they receive their professional edu-
cation. One reason why this should be the case is that optometry
schoolswould seem more likelyto draw entering students from their own
states.Thisis because home statestudents are often given preferential
treathentwhenconsidered foradmission and often face loirier tuition
18
costs.
Toserveas a proxy forthe stringency of state licensing require—
ments a national boarddummy variableis includedin the location equa-
tion.Thisvariabletakes on a value of one for those states which did— 11—
not acceptthe national board examination in 1968. The national board
.vai"ination was accepted in lieu of the written portion of the state
19 licensing examination in 26 states in 1968.The failing rates on in-
dividualstate licensing examinationswould probablybe a more approp-
riate barrier to entry variable, but such data are not available.
Implicit in the use of the national board dummy is the assumptionthat
thosestates which do not accept the national board examinations also
have the most stringent licensing reauirements. Although state
licensing requirements are established for the expressed purposeof
ensuringthathigh standards of optometric care arepracticed,many
economistshave argued thatlicensingis used by members of a profes-
sion in order to limit the number of competing practitioners. Itis
interesting to note that in most cases it is the professions that have
demanded that their members be licensed. Consumers, who supposedly
needtobe protected from malpractice, have been less concerned about
professional licensure.
There is evidence that the licensing arrangements of some profes-
sions have been used to restrict labor mobility between states. Holen
found that interstate mobility in law and dentistry was lowrelativeto
medicine because of the structure of licensing arrangements ...(and)
because of the exclusionary practices of various state licensing
,,20 boards. She found that those states in which lawyers or dentists
enjoyed high incomes also tended to have high failure rates among
candidates for license. This was not true for the case of physicians,
where restrictions on interstate mobility are small because of— 12—
reciprocityagreements and the use of national boards. Maurizi has pre-
sented regression results that support the hypothesis that state licensing
boards adjust the pass rate on licensing examinations in order to protect
21
the incomes of those already licensed.
5.2b The Workloads of 0pcunetrists
Priceis theonly variable in the workload equation. Optometrists
areexpected to take on greater workloads the higher theirperunitre—
.
wardfor doing so, unless their supply curves are backward bending and
the average optometrist operates on that portion that is negatively
sloped.
6. pirical Results
6.1The Demand for Optometric Services
The second stage estimates of the demand equations are presented in
Table i.22 All variables are in logs with theexception of the adver-
Usingdummy. The per capita income coefficients (elasticities) vary
from .34to .59in the demand equations. This range is high relative to
theincome elasticities of demand estimated for physician services by
23 .
FuchsandKramer.A relatively higher income elasticity of demand for
optometric services is not unexpected. A good portion of optometric
services, such as tinted glasses, re expensive, stylish frames and
extra glasses, wouldseemto fall into the luxuryM category. In fact,
the income elasticity of eye health services could be substantially greater
than .5. The income elasticity of demand for optometric services would































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































toutilize the services of ophthalmologists and opticians rather than op.-
toinetrists to secure optical prescriptions and corrective lenses increased
24 with income.
The interpretation of the coefficients of the advertising dummy and
the education and price variables is hazardous because of mu].ticollinearity.
The advertising dummy varies markedly in the estimated demand equations.
Inregression 4, withtheprice variable excluded,the advertising dummy
coefficientis significant at the 3 percent confidencelevel25 and indi-
cates thatthedemand for optometric services is 13 percentgreater in
those stateswhere advertising is not restricted. However, with price
includedinthe demand equation the t values of the advertising duxruny fall
to below one.
The education variable is positively related to the quantity of Opto-
metricserv.ices demanded and approaches statistical significance in equa-
tion1, wheretheadvertising dummydoes not appear. In regressions 2, 4,
educationis included with the advertising dummy and is statistically in-
significant. An insignificant education coefficient would lend support
tothe hypothesis that thetendency to utilize the services of ophthal-
mologists andopticiansrather than optometrists to secure optical pre-
scriptions and corrective lenses increases with education. This conclusion
follows if it is accepted that the taste for corrective lenses increases
with education. This assumption seems reasonable. The more educated place
a greater emphasis on goodhealthandprobablyhave a greater interest in
reading, an activity that requires the useofcorrective lenses in most
casesbymiddle age.— 15—
Theprice coeffiàieflt varies from —.48 to —1.54 in regressions 1—3,
but becomes positive in regressions 5 and 6 when the education and adver-
tising variables are excluded from the estimated demand equations.
The coefficients and statistical significance of the race and age
variables remain fairly stable in the estimated regression equations.
The positive association between the demand for optometric services and
the percent of the population 65 and over is an expected result given
the increased utilization of corrective lenses with age. The age elas-
ticity is approxin%ately.5. The percent of the population that is non-
white is negatively related to the quantity of optometric services
demanded. The negative association can be explained in part by the
stronger vision possessed by Negroes. Perhaps an equally important
explanation, however, is the higher price of securing optometric ser-
vices that Negroes probably confront because of higher transportation
and search costs. Many Negroes live in urban ghettos or rural areas in
the South where optometric care is relatively scarce.
The regression results provide no decisive evidence on the extent
to which the services of ophthalmologists and opticians are substituted
for optometric services. This is true because of the inconclusive re-
gression estimates as well as the considerations discussed above (see
pp. 6—7). The optician. variable is highly significant and negatively
related to the demand for optometric services when the ophthalmologist
variable does not appear in the demand equation. When the two competing
eye professional variables are entered together, however, the optician— 16—
variableis significant at only the 30 percent confidence level. The
ophthalmologist variable is always statistically insignificant,even
26
when the optician variable is excluded from the demandmodels.
The "better performance" of the optician variable mayindicate that
opticiansoffer services that aremorecompetitive with those of the op-
tometrist thanistrue for the eye care services provided by ophthalmolo-
gists. This interpretation is consistent withthe fact that the dispen-
sing portion of the optometrist's practice comprisesthe major portion of
servicessupplied. According to the output measureused in this study,
the dispensing of corrective lenses comprises 76 percentof optometric
output and visual exams the remaining 24percent.27 The coefficient of
the optician variableis stable at about —.20 in all the estimated demand
equations.— 17—
6.2The Location of Optometrists
The second stage estimates of the location equation are






All variables are in logs except the number of graduating optometry students
and the national board dummy. The t—statistics are in parentheses.
Optometrists appear to be quite sensitive to price in making their
location decision.This price coefficient of 1.01 is in the upper range of
the price elasticities for the percapitasupply of physicians reported by
Fuchsand Kramer.Optcmietrists may be more sensitive to interstate varia-
tions inprice because they are morelikely to migrate (interstate) than
physicians. This conclusion is basedonthe assumption that migration in
boththeseprofessions is undertaken predominately by recent graduates of
theprofessional schools. The established practices of older practitioners
should make thest reluctant to migrate. Recent graduates of optometry
schools should be more prone to migrate than their physician counterparts— 18—
becauseof themuchsmaller numberof optometry schools.There existed
only ten optometry schools in nine states in 1968, while medical schools
were located in nearly every state. The national board dummycoefficient
indicates thatstatelicensing examinations areaneffective means of
restricting entry, given the assumption that states which do not accept
the national boards in optometry have the more stringent licensing re-
quirements. The duxriny coefficient indicates that states with more
restrictive licensinq requirements have 15 percent fewer optometrists
per 100,000 population, holding other variables equal,thanthose
states with less restrictive licensing arrangements. To put this
another way, consumers in those states with restrictive licensing
requirements could have a substantially larger stock of optometrists
from which to choose if these entry restrictions were eased.
The graduating optometry student coefficient demonstrates that
optometristshave at least a slight rrooensity to remain in the state
where they receive their professional education. The elasticity of
the numberofoptometrists per 100,000 population with respect to the
nLmther of graduating optometrists inherent in the regression results is
very small, approximately .03. A small elasticity is to be expected be-
cause only nine states have optometry schools in the United States, so
asignificant aunt ofoutmigration musttakeplaceby optometrists
from the state where they receive their professional training, or optome-
trists would be much less evenly distributed around the country than they
presently are.Theelasticity must also be small because the total number
ofgraduates from optometry schools in anyone year is small in relation
to thestock of practicing optometrists.— 19—
Theattraction of optometrists to high per capita income states,
holding price constant, indicates thatenvironmentalfactors which are
correlated with percapitaincome play a significant role in their
location decision. This finding is discussed in more detail in
Section 7.
6.3 The Workloads of Optometrists
The simple reqressipfl of the logofaverage workloads on the log
of price yields:
Log average workload —3.22—1.05logprice.
(2.15) (—3.43)
The t—statistics are in parenthesis. The obvious explanation of the nega-
tive price coefficient is that optometrists are on the backward bending
portion of a labor supply curve. The price coefficient showsthat an
instate price increase of 10 percent should reduce the average workloads
of optometrists by about10percent. The supply of optometric services
within the state would remain about the same, however. The regression
resultsfor thelocation equation indicate that the per capita number
ofoptometrists would increase by approximately 10 percent as a result
of a 10 percent price increase.
7.Implications of the Research
At the outset of this paper a brief discussion was provided of the
concern of many health economists over the uneven distribution of health
professionals, particularly between urban and rural areas. Optometrists,
as wellas physicians, were seen to be relatively scarceinrural areas.—20-
I
Theestimation of the market modelforoptometric services in this study
provides some insight into the reasons for the uneven distribution of
health manpower. The estimation of the equation describing the location
decision of optometrists revealed that price, per capita income and the
stringency ofstate licensing requirements were the most importantdeter-
minants ofthe location of optometrists. In Table 2 the means of these
variablesarepresented for the urban and rural states included in the
cross section.The regression results and the data in Table 2 together
indicate that differences in the price of output and in the environmental
and cultural qualities of a state that correlate with percapitaincome
primarily explain the uneven distribution of optometric manpower between
urban and rural states. Differences in the stringency of state licensing
requirements,as represented bythe national board dummy, work in favor
ofruralstates in terms of the location of optometric manpower.
The mean number of optometrists per 100,000 population.in the
nineteen urban states is 9.71. This is 15 percent greater thanthe
mean number of 8.45 optometrists per 100,000 population in the
thirteen rural states. The price coefficient in the estimated loca-
tionequation indicates that if the price of output in rural states
increased to the urban state mean, or by 5.5percent, the mean number
of optometrists per100,000would increase by the same percentage.
The price effect, therefore, does not account for the majorportionof
the discrepancy in the per capita number of optometrists between urban
and rural states. Apparently, the environmental and cultural attributes.
— 21—
TABLE2
Sample Means of Location Decision Variables for
Optometrists, Urban and Rural States
in the urbancategory have 55 percent or more of
their population in urban areas.
Variable Name Urban Statesa Rural States
price $7.69 $7.29
Per—capita income $4,068 $3,251
National Board Dummy .63 .53
N 19 13— 22—
ofa state that correlate with oer capita income primarily explain the
optometrist's preferencefor urbanover rural areas. The per capita
income coefficient in the location equation suggests that the 25 per-
centhigher income level in urbanstates has attracted15 percent
optometriststhan would have been the case if urbanstateincomes were
at the rural state level. It is thislifestyle differential, then,
thatappearsto be mainly responsible for the uneven distribution of
optometrists between urbanandrural areas.
The sameeffectcould be very important in explaining the urban-
rural discrepancy in te location of physicians. The per—capita income
coefficients in the physician location equation estimated by Fuchs and
Kramerwereas high as .5 andstatisticallysignificant with price also
28
included as one of the other independent variables. The stock of
physicians in urbanstatesis 34 percent greater than in rural states.29
More thanone-third of this urban—rural state disparity in the per
capita number of physicians can be accounted for by the differences in
life—styleopportunities,given the per-capita incomedifferential of
about25percent and assumingtheupper range of Fuchsand Kramer's
estimated per-capitaincome coefficients from their location equation
arerelevant.
The relative scarcity of optometrist's in rural areas does not
translate unimpededintoa similar differential in the supply of
optametricservices.The estimated price coefficient in the workload
equation showed the average optometrist to offer less services in
response to increases in price. The price of optometric services in— 23—
urbanstatesis 5.5 percent higher than in rural states (see Table 2).
Accordingtothe price coefficient in the workload eauation, average
workloads in urbanstatesshould correspondingly be about 5.5 percent
lees.Aboutone—third of the differential in per capita optometric
msnpowerbetweenurban and rural states, therefore, is made up for in
terms of the total supply of optometric services by higher workloads
taken on by rural optometrists because of lower market prices.
The same argument could also be relevant to the supply of physi-
cian services in urban and rural areas. Regression results have been
presentedby Fuchs and Framer and by Feldstein which supportthe
hypothesisthat physicians reducesupply in response to an increase in
fees.3° Thismay be a partial explanation of why residents of rural
areas are not in poor health relative to urban residents. The relative
scarcityin the supply of physician services in rural areasmaynotbe
nearly as great as the relative scarcity of physicians.Footnotes
1In1968 there were 18,299 optometrists in active practice. Self-
employed optometrists totaled 16,218. (National Center for Health Sta-
tistics, Optometrists flnoioyed in Health Services, United States, 1968,
DepartmentofHEW Publication No. (HsM) 73—1803, Vital Health Statistics —
Series14, No. 8.) In 1969, the mean annual gross income of practicing
optometristwas$46 thousand. (Fred Chipnan, "AOA1969Economic Survey,
Part W, Journal of the American Ootometric Association, Vol. 41, No. 6,
June1970,p. 551.)
2National Center for Health Statistics, Optometrists Employed in
Health Services, p. 14.
Survey of Optometrists," Journal of the American Optometric
Assocjation, Vol. 40, No. 12, December 1969, p. 1195.
4OpticiansEmployed inHealth Services, United States, 1969, Detart—
mentofHEW Publication No. (HSM) 72—1052, Vital Health Statistics —
Series14,No. 3, pp. 8—9.
hthalmologyManpower:Characteristics of Clinical Practice,
United States, 1968, Department of HEW Publication No. (HMS) 73—1802,
Vital Health Statistics —Series14, No. 7.
5States classified as urbanhave55 percent ormore oftheir popula-
tion in urbanareas •Thestate percapita numbers ofphysicians were
weightedby state population in computing theurbanand rural states means.p— 2
The 1971 per capita number of physicians by state was taken from
bution of Phicians in the U.S., 1971, Center for Health Services,
Research and Development, AMA, Chicago, 1973.
considerations presented in footnote 5 apply here as well. The
per capita number of eye professionals by state was taken from Optome—
trists Employed in Health Services, op. cit.; Opticians Emtloyed in Health
Services, op. cit.; and Oohthalmology Manr>ower, op. cit.
7?ein argues that many rural ohvsicians have reached an age where the
increased need for leisure time has offset the productivity gains assoc-
iated with work experience. See Rashi Fein, The Doctor Shortage, The Brook-
ingsInstitute,Washington, D.C., 1967, pp. 74—75.
8Victor Fuchs and Marcia Kramer, The Determinants of the Expenditures
for Physician Services in the United States, 1948-68, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Occasional Paper 117 and DHEW publication HSM 73—3013,
1972.
9Thiamodel is very similar to the market model for physician ser-
vices estimated by Fuchá and Kramer, .cit.
10Cptometrists Employed in Health Services, United States, 1968,
Department of Health, Education and Welfare Publication No. (HSM)73-1803,
VitalHealth Statistics —Series14, No. 8.
procedure is described thoroughly in Douglas Coate, "The
Optimal Employment of Inputs in Fee for Service, for Profit Health
Practices: the Case of Optometrists," NBERWorking Paper, October 1975.F- 3
2See LeeBenham,"The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eye—
glasses," Journal of LawandEconomics, October 1972, pp. 337-353.
13
,inocuiarVisual Acuity of Adults, U.S., 1960—62,
National Center for Health Statistics, Series 11, No. 3.
14
,Characteristicsof Persons with Corrective Lenses,
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